

BTECH 451

Threat Detection and Behaviour Profiling

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SOVEREIGN



ASB
Securities



Project Objective


Evolve

Grow

Mature

Project Phases

- Threat Profiling and Detection
- Behaviour Profiling and Base lining



Case Studies

- TJ Max and Marshalls Breach – 2007
- Carbanak – 2012 - ?
- Shell Shock – 2014
- Heartbleed – 2014
- Sony Entertainment Breach – 2014
- JP Morgan and Chase Breach – 2014
- Apple Icloud Breach - 2014

Case Studies

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Carbanak

- Losses from Carbanak per bank range from \$2.5 million to approximately \$10 million
- Up to 100 financial institutions have been hit. Total financial losses could be as high as \$1bn.
- Each bank robbery took 2-4 months, from infecting the first computer to cashing the money out

CYBER KILL CHAIN®

A ADVANCED

Targeted,
Coordinated,
Purposeful

P PERSISTENT

Month after Month,
Year after Year

T THREAT

Person(s) with
intent, opportunity,
and capability

WEAPONIZATION

Coupling exploit
with backdoor into
deliverable payload

EXPLOITATION

Exploiting a
vulnerability to
execute code on
victim's system

COMMAND & CONTROL (C2)

Command channel for
remote manipulation
of victim

RECONNAISSANCE

Harvesting email
addresses, conference
information, etc

DELIVERY

Delivering weaponized
bundle to the victim via
email, web, USB, etc

INSTALLATION

Installing malware
on the asset

ACTIONS ON OBJECTIVES

With 'Hands on
Keyboard' access,
intruders accomplish
their original goal

Lockheed Martin, 2014

ASB

How the Carbanak cybergang stole \$1bn

A targeted attack on a bank

1. Infection



100s of machines infected in search of the admin PC






2. Harvesting Intelligence


Intercepting the clerks' screens




3. Mimicking the staff

How the money was stolen





SIEM Architecture



SIEM – Use of Global Threat Intelligence (GTI)

- Cloud based threat intelligence tool
- Gathers data from millions of sensors worldwide
- Allows real time decision making based on preset rules
 - File Reputation
 - Web Reputation
 - Message Reputation
 - Network Connection Reputation

SIEM – Use of IP Blacklists

- Third party blacklists of known malicious activity
- Open source databases
 - Malc0de
 - EmergingThreats
- Can target particular types of malware
 - Zeus tracker
 - Dyre


```
#####  
# abuse.ch Zeus IP blacklist "BadIPs" (excluding hijacked sites and free hosting providers) #  
#  
# For questions please refer to https://zeustracker.abuse.ch/blocklist.php  
#####  
  
101.0.89.3  
103.19.89.118  
103.230.84.239  
103.241.0.100  
103.25.60.69  
103.26.128.84  
103.4.52.150  
103.7.59.135  
108.175.157.56  
109.120.183.106  
109.127.8.242  
109.169.87.141  
109.229.210.250  
109.229.36.65  
109.235.59.44  
109.237.111.221  
112.90.176.76  
113.29.230.24  
115.29.107.114  
116.193.77.118  
120.31.130.230  
120.63.157.195  
122.155.3.150  
123.30.129.179  
123.56.110.204  
124.110.195.160  
128.210.157.251  
131.72.138.45  
131.72.139.163  
131.72.139.65  
144.76.162.245  
146.185.221.199  
151.100.60.62  
151.97.190.239  
155.133.18.115  
157.7.170.62  
160.97.52.229  
162.221.186.120  
167.88.15.203  
172.245.4.38  
173.230.253.193  
173.247.245.154  
174.142.197.90  
175.107.192.78  
176.116.0.24  
176.31.241.208  
177.4.23.159  
178.17.170.132  
178.216.52.178  
179.43.158.10  
180.182.234.200  
185.106.120.139  
185.106.120.171  
187.58.233.60
```

Abuse.ch – Swiss Security Blog, 2015

Current System


- Default Summary
- GTI Inbound and Outbound
- Inbound Exe
- Inbound Office

Current System – Default Summary




Current System – Inbound Exe.

- Detects and record all inbound executable files.
 - SEM looks into header of file to determine type.
 - Done by looking at the unique “signature ID”



Last Time	Event Count	Source IP	Destination IP	Filename	Host	URL
2015/05/19 10:03:34	1	210.55.180.44		logstash	download.elastic.co	http://download.elastic.co/logstash/logstash/
2015/05/19 08:56:28	1	122.56.5.200		sonar-runner	repo1.maven.org	http://repo1.maven.org/maven2/org/codehaus
2015/05/19 02:24:13	47	64.39.106.168		bb-hist.sh		http://nfuse.asbbank.co.nz/bb-hist.sh?HISTFI


Subsystem Creation



Subsystem Creation – Version 1.0



Subsystem Creation – Malicious File Subsystem



Key Challenges

- Familiarity with and size of Dataset
- Missing Dataset
- Access Privileges

Timeline – Events prior to mid-year



Complete

Research on ASB's current implementation of the SIEM platform

Case studies on related security breaches

Research on current threats and mitigation techniques


Creation of customized subsystem and completion of first milestone



Current

Research on behaviour profiling and base lining methodologies

Literature survey of problem statement. Analysis of peer reviewed publications




Future

Selection of behaviour profiling scheme

Implementation of scheme in ASB Enterprise

Testing and evaluation of implemented scheme



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ASB