

BTECH 451

Threat Detection and Behaviour Profiling

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SOVEREIGN



Project Objective


Evolve

Grow

Mature

Project Phases

- Threat Profiling and Detection
- Behaviour Profiling and Base lining



Case Studies

- TJ Max and Marshalls Breach – 2007
- Carbanak – 2012 - ?
- Shell Shock – 2014
- Heartbleed – 2014
- Sony Entertainment Breach – 2014
- JP Morgan and Chase Breach – 2014
- Apple Icloud Breach - 2014

Case Studies

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Carbanak

- Losses from Carbanak per bank range from \$2.5 million to approximately \$10 million
- Up to 100 financial institutions have been hit. Total financial losses could be as a high as \$1bn.
- Each bank robbery took 2-4 months, from infecting the first computer to cashing the money out

CYBER KILL CHAIN®

A ADVANCED

Targeted,
Coordinated,
Purposeful

P PERSISTENT

Month after Month,
Year after Year

T THREAT

Person(s) with
intent, opportunity,
and capability

WEAPONIZATION

Coupling exploit
with backdoor into
deliverable payload

EXPLOITATION

Exploiting a
vulnerability to
execute code on
victim's system

COMMAND & CONTROL (C2)

Command channel for
remote manipulation
of victim

RECONNAISSANCE

Harvesting email
addresses, conference
information, etc

DELIVERY

Delivering weaponized
bundle to the victim via
email, web, USB, etc

INSTALLATION

Installing malware
on the asset

ACTIONS ON OBJECTIVES

With 'Hands on
Keyboard' access,
intruders accomplish
their original goal

Lockheed Martin, 2014

How the Carbanak cybergang stole \$1bn

A targeted attack on a bank

1. Infection



Carbanak
backdoor sent
as an attachment



Bank
employee

2. Harvesting Intelligence

Intercepting the clerks' screens



100s of machines infected

in search of the admin PC



3. Mimicking the staff

How the money was stolen

Online-banking

Money was transferred
to fraudsters' accounts

E-payment systems

Money was transferred
to banks in China and the US

Inflating account balances


The extra funds were pocketed
via a fraudulent transaction

Controlling ATMs


Orders to dispense cash at a
pre-determined time

GREAT

KASPERSKY



SIEM Architecture



SIEM – Use of Global Threat Intelligence (GTI)

- Cloud based threat intelligence tool
- Gathers data from millions of sensors worldwide
- Allows real time decision making based on preset rules
 - File Reputation
 - Web Reputation
 - Message Reputation
 - Network Connection Reputation

SIEM – Use of IP Blacklists

- Third party blacklists of known malicious activity
- Open source databases
 - Malc0de
 - EmergingThreats
- Can target particular types of malware
 - Zeus tracker
 - Dyre


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#####
# abuse.ch Zeus IP blocklist "BadIPs" (excluding hijacked sites and free hosting providers)
# For questions please refer to https://zeustracker.abuse.ch/blocklist.php
#####

101.0.89.3
103.19.89.118
103.230.84.239
103.241.0.100
103.25.60.69
103.26.128.84
103.27.12.150
103.7.53.135
108.175.157.56
109.120.183.106
109.127.8.242
109.169.87.141
109.229.210.250
109.229.36.65
109.235.59.44
109.237.111.221
112.90.176.76
113.29.230.24
115.19.107.114
116.193.77.198
116.31.130.230
120.63.157.195
122.155.3.150
123.30.129.179
123.56.110.204
124.110.195.160
128.210.157.251
131.72.138.45
131.72.139.163
131.72.139.65
134.186.221.245
146.185.221.199
151.100.60.62
151.97.190.239
155.133.18.115
157.7.170.62
160.97.52.229
162.221.186.12
167.88.15.203
172.245.4.38
173.230.253.193
173.241.245.154
174.142.197.90
175.107.191.78
176.116.0.24
176.31.241.208
177.4.23.159
178.17.170.132
178.216.52.178
179.43.158.10
180.182.234.200
185.106.120.139
185.106.120.171
```

Current System

- Default Summary
- GTI Inbound and Outbound
- Inbound Exe
- Inbound Office

Current System – Default Summary




Current System – Inbound Exe.

- Detects and record all inbound executable files.
 - SEM looks into header of file to determine type.
 - Done by looking at the unique “signature ID”

Events						
Bound to Object_Type						
Last Time	Event Count	Source IP	Destination IP	Filename	Host	URL
2015/05/19 10:03:34	1	210.55.180.44		logstash	download.elastic.co	http://download.elastic.co/logstash/logstash/1
2015/05/19 08:56:28	1	122.56.5.200		sonar-runner	repo1.maven.org	http://repo1.maven.org/maven2/org/codehaus/sonar-runner/2.4.2/sonar-runner-2.4.2.jar
2015/05/19 02:24:13	47	64.39.106.168		bb-hist.sh		http://nfuse.asbbank.co.nz/bb-hist.sh?HISTFILE=bb-hist.sh


Subsystem Creation



Subsystem Creation – Version 1.0



Subsystem Creation – Malicious File Subsystem



Key Challenges

- Familiarity with and size of Dataset
- Missing Dataset
- Access Privelages

Timeline – Events prior to mid-year



Complete

Research on ASB's current implementation of the SIEM platform

Case studies on related security breaches

Research on current threats and mitigation techniques

Creation of customized subsystem and completion of first milestone



Current

Research on behaviour profiling and base lining methodologies

Literature survey of problem statement. Analysis of peer reviewed publications



Future

Selection of behaviour profiling scheme

Implementation of scheme in ASB Enterprise

Testing and evaluation of implemented scheme



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